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Checklists of factors are a helpful feature in assisting courts to determine how to
find the proper balance in a variety of situations. Properly used they can help to
achieve a certain level of uniformity and predictability, though they do not guarantee it. However, it is also important to recognize that checklists are a way of
getting at the right analysis — they are not in and of themselves that analysis.
Checklists also create the possibility of becoming encumbered in specifics and
therefore losing sight of the overall goal.
The Supreme Court decided two decades ago that the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard was a normative standard. That is, it is meant to be a reflection
of an entitlement: "the standards of privacy that persons can expect to enjoy in a
free and democratic society."1 In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically
rejected the notion that a reasonable expectation of privacy could be assessed by
means of a "risk analysis." They held that "privacy would be inadequately protected if an assessment of the reasonableness of a given expectation of privacy
were made to rest on a consideration whether the person concerned had courted
the risk of electronic surveillance."2
The Court has done much to give structure to the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis since then, formulating factors in Edwards? Tessling,4 and more
recently Patrick.^ At no time, however, has the Court ever suggested that its
fundamental approach has changed: the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is still to be judged normatively, not against the practical risk of being
observed through technological means.
Although this point is crucial, however, neither "not a risk analysis" nor "judge
on a normative basis" are specifically among the factors articulated in various
cases. Rather, they are meant to affect the way in which the factors are analysed.
It is over this point that one can have difficulty with the reasoning of the Court
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of Appeal here. The court articulates the factors to be considered correctly. In
considering those factors, however, they lean very heavily to a risk analysis
approach.
The subject matter of the search was a collection of greenhouses with plastic
walls which permitted limited viewing of the interior. "Anyone in an airplane,
helicopter, or other aerial device would have been able to see what the police
observed. Anyone using binoculars would have seen what the police saw and the
zoom lens [used was] readily available at retail stores." 6 The police were able to
see a marijuana plant through a "door left open."7 Although the information was
not in fact in any third party hands, "it could easily have been if anyone flew
over the property with binoculars or a camera."8 No intimate details of the accused's lifestyle could be found to have been exposed "by reason of the material
from which the greenhouses were constructed."9
At virtually every point in the analysis, the Court of Appeal's reasoning depends
in part or in whole on risk analysis reasoning. They focus on whether it was in
fact possible for the police to arrange to observe the accused's property without
either his or judicial permission: the proper question was whether, by the standards of privacy that persons can expect to enjoy in a free and democratic society, they should have been permitted to do so.
The results of that approach are apparent here. For example, as described in the
court's judgment, the greenhouses were in a difficult to access portion of a property in a remote rural location, they were partially obscured by a stand of trees
toward which the doors opened, and were obscured at ground level by a tarp
strung across a gap in the stand of trees. The plants were located inside those
structures. However, a police officer Hew over neighbouring properties on three
separate occasions and observed with a telephoto lens from a distance of 1000
feet in the air and in the course of doing so observed "from one angle, a plant he
thought was marihuana through an open door."10 On these facts, the court is
able to conclude, "obviously, the plant was thus in public view."1' This analysis
focuses solely on the possibility (and the slim one, it is difficult not to note) of
the plant being observed. If there is any basis for concluding that the accused
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was not entitled, in a free and democratic society, to expect a level of privacy
which meant that members of the public would not see the plant, that analysis is
not explored in the decision.
Similarly, note the court's consideration of the listed factor of whether the property had been abandoned: their entire analysis is that "this factor does not appear to have any application in the case at bar."12 If one is considering the issue
solely from a risk analysis point of view, that is perhaps true. If, however, one is
considering the issue as a matter of entitlement, the fact that property has not
been abandoned is decidedly relevant as a consideration which enhances the
protection one should receive in a free and democratic society.
The risk analysis approach would be a fundamental shift in the Canadian privacy
protection analysis. It would also be a significant diminution of that protection,
for reasons which are even truer today than they were when first noted by the
Court twenty years ago in Wong: "we can only be sure of being free from surveillance today if we retire to our basements, cloak our windows, turn out the
lights and remain absolutely quiet." 13 Any abandonment of the normative approach to analysing reasonable expectation of privacy should be firmly
resisted.14
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